一、主題：Systemic risk-taking at banks: Evidence from the pricing of syndicated loans

二、主講人：宮迪，荷蘭蒂爾堡大學經濟學博士，倫敦經濟學院訪問學者。2010年獲得中國人民大學金融學學士學位，2012年獲得蒂爾堡大學經濟學碩士學位。研究領域包括銀行與金融中介、金融經濟學等。其研究成果在Emerging Scholars in Banking & Finance Conference, International Finance and Banking Society Conference, FDIC-JFSR Annual Bank Research Conference, INFER Workshop on Banking in Europe等多個國際學術會議參加宣講，并獲得EBC Junior Fellow Best Paper Award，Royal Economic Society Conference Grant等獎項。

三、時間：2014年11月17日（周一），12：30-13：30

四、地點：bevictor伟德官网主樓913會議室

五、主持：黃志剛，bevictor伟德官网副教授、院長助理

論文摘要：Public guarantees in the event of joint bank failures can result in systemic risk-taking and distort financing decisions of banks. I argue that the pricing of syndicated loans provides an ideal laboratory to study such distortions. In the absence of systemic risk-taking, non-diversi ability of aggregate risk implies that the compensation required for taking on aggregate risk is higher than for idiosyncratic risk. However, in the presence of public guarantees, banks have higher benefits from taking on aggregate risk as this leads to higher correlation across banks. Consistent with the latter I find that, after controlling for rm, loan and bank specific factors, banks charge lower rates for systematic risk than for idiosyncratic risk. The effect is large. Importantly, there is no evidence for systemic risk-taking for the sample of non-bank lenders who do not benefit from public guarantees. I also find that effect is larger for smaller and less correlated banks, consistent with higher a priori benefits from systemic risk-taking for such banks. The evidence provided suggests that public bail-out policies have significant ex-ante costs by distorting financing decisions in the economy.