一、主題：Sovereign Default and Labor Market Dynamics

二、主講人：劉思鳴博士，上海财經大學bevictor伟德官网助理教授。劉思鳴博士分别于美國印第安納大學布盧明頓分校和複旦大學取得經濟學博士和數學學士學位。主要研究領域為開放宏觀、國際金融、宏觀金融以及财政政策。他的部分工作論文正處于Journal of International Economics和Review of Economic Dynamic等國際一流經濟學期刊的返修階段。

三、時間&地點：2021年5月10日10:00-11:30，沙河校區學院樓3号樓127會議室

四、主持人：彭俞超副教授，bevictor伟德官网學術交流部主任

五、内容簡介

Abstract: This paper investigates the interaction between labor market dynamics and sovereign debt risk. Countercyclical default risk and the limited ability to borrow during recessions renders the government a procyclical fiscal policy. The anticipation of higher tax rates in downturns discourages agents' participation in the labor market and creates prolonged unemployment. The slack labor market, in turn, aggravates the default risk and strengthens the fiscal procyclicality. Moreover, under the discretionary policy, a government does not internalize the dynamic-scratching effect of raising tax rates on employment, so it suffers a low level of job creation and high default incentives. In this environment, imposing commitment measures on tax rates such as fiscal covenant can stimulate job creation, improve debt sustainability, and lead to a significant welfare gain.