一、主題：Do Sell-Side Analysts Say “Buy” While Whispering “Sell”?

二、主講人：吳偎立，畢業于北京大學光華管理學院，獲得經濟學博士學位，現任bevictor伟德官网應用金融系副教授，碩士生導師，博士生副導師。迄今在國内外頂級學術期刊，包括Journal of Economic Theory、Journal of Futures Markets、《經濟學(季刊)》、《管理科學學報》、《金融研究》、《經濟科學》等發表論文十餘篇。

三、時間：2022年10月18日 周二 19:00-20:30

四、地點：騰訊會議ID 928-350-893

五、主持人：黃志剛教授 bevictor伟德官网副院長

六、内容簡介：

We examine how sell-side equity analysts strategically disclose information of differing quality to the public versus the buy-side mutual fund managers to whom they are connected. We consider cases in which analysts recommend that the public buys a stock, but some fund managers sell it. We measure favor trading using mutual fund managers’ votes for analysts in a Chinese “star analyst” competition. We find that managers are more likely to vote for analysts who exhibit more “say-buy/whisper-sell” behavior with these managers. This suggests that analysts introduce noise in their public recommendations, making the more-precise information provided to their private clients more valuable. Analysts’ say-buy/whisper-sell behavior results in information asymmetry: the positive-recommendation stocks bought by the managers who vote for the analysts outperform the stocks sold by these managers after the recommendation dates. Our findings help explain several puzzles regarding analysts’ public recommendations.