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中國銀行業X-無效率v.s.尋租:基于Bootstrapping的DEA 方法的實證檢驗

[發布日期]:2007-03-28  [浏覽次數]:

時間:2007-3-27

Kent Matthews*, Jianguang Guo**, Nina Zhang*

* Cardiff Business School , Cardiff University , Wales

** Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing

Abstract

The existing Chinese banking system was born out of a state-planning framework focussed on the funding of state-owned enterprises. Despite the development of a modern banking system, numerous studies of Chinese banking point to its high level of average inefficiency. Much of this inefficiency relates to the high level of non-performing loans held on the banks books. This study argues that a significant component of inefficiency relates to a defunct bureaucratic incentive structure. Using bootstrap non-parametric techniques the paper decomposes cost-inefficiency into X-inefficiency and rational inefficiency caused by bureaucratic rent seeking. In contrast to other studies of the Chinese banking sector, the paper argues that a change in the incentive structure and the competitive threat of the opening up of the banking market in 2007 has produced reduced inefficiency and improved performance.

Keywords: Bank Efficiency, China , X-inefficiency; DEA. Bootstrapping

JEL codes: D23, G21, G28



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