一、主題：Board excessive compensation and mutual funds’ exit decisions
二、主講人： 張悅，本科畢業于bevictor伟德官网。巴斯大學金融學博士，現任中山大學國際bevictor伟德官网助理教授。目前主要的研究興趣是共同基金、公司治理和金融科技。
三、時間：2020年6月16日星期二，10:00 -11:30
四、地點：騰訊會議【具體房間臨時通知】
五、主持人：魏旭副教授  

Abstract: Using a large, and hand-collected dataset of over 10,000 U.S. mutual funds, this paper studies the time-varying relationship between directors’ excessive compensation and fund exit decisions during the period 2002-2014. Our results extend existing evidence by showing that excessive compensation is a preferable measure to explain fund exit decisions in comparison with total compensation. The results show that fund exits are affected by two competing forces: (i) fund-families’ cost-reduction and (ii) independent directors’ remuneration concerns. We show that the fund-families’ cost reduction factor dominates during the non-financial-crisis period but the opposite is true during the 2008 financial crisis. We document that directors’ ownership, board independence, and board diversity also have some explanatory power in fund exit decisions.