一、主題：Contracting with Feedback

二、主講人：劉琦，北京大學光華管理學院金融學助理教授。畢業于賓夕法尼亞大學沃頓商學院，獲金融博士學位。研究方向是公司金融、金融市場和行為金融學。他的研究成果在Review of Finance、Economics Letters、Management Science等國際刊物發表。與Alex Edmans教授合作的論文“Inside Debt”獲得2011年度Sp?ngler IQAM最佳論文獎。

三、時間：2016年12月21日（周三），16:00-17:00

四、地點：主樓910會議室

五、主持人：顧弦，bevictor伟德官网講師

摘要：We study the effect of financial market conditions on managerial compensation structure. First, we analyze the optimal pay-for-performance in a model in which corporate decisions and firm value are both endogenous to trading due to feedback from information contained in stock prices. In a less frictional financial market, the improved information content of stock prices helps guide managerial decisions, and this information substitutes out part of direct incentive provision in compensation contracts. Thus, the optimal pay-for-performance is lowered in response to reductions in market frictions. Second, we test our theory using two quasi-natural experiments and find evidence that is consistent with the theory. Our results indicate that the financial market environment plays an important role in shaping CEO compensation structure.