倪骁然| 193期雙周學術論壇：Shareholder Litigation Rights and the Cost of Debt: Evidence from Derivative Lawsuits

一、主題：Shareholder Litigation Rights and the Cost of Debt: Evidence from Derivative Lawsuits

二、主講人：倪骁然，清華大學經濟管理學院金融系博士研究生。本科畢業于清華大學。主要研究領域為公司治理和中國資本市場。研究成果曾在Economics Letters、《管理世界》、《經濟學（季刊）》等國内外刊物發表。

三、時間：2017年3月15日（周三），12:30-13:30

四、地點：學院南路校區主教學樓910會議室

五、主持人：黃志剛，bevictor伟德官网副教授

Abstract: Exploiting the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws as exogenous shocks to filing derivative lawsuits, we find that weakened shareholder litigation rights cause a significant increase in the cost of debt. Further analyses indicate this relation is largely driven by heightened managerial risk-taking. Shareholders respond to these changes by providing managers with less risk-taking incentives. Overall, our findings suggest that the shareholder litigation rights are important to debtholders.