一、主題：Private Benefits in IPOs: Evidence from State-Owned Firms

二、主講人：陳兆輝，美國弗吉尼亞大學Mclntire商學院副教授。他本科畢業于複旦大學，在賓夕法尼亞大學獲得博士學位。研究領域包括公司金融理論、産業組織、投資銀行等。近期他的研究話題是融資合同和聲譽。他的研究成果在國際學術刊物Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis、Journal of Corpaorate Finance、Journal of Financial Economics等上發表，并曾參加大量國際學術會議。

三、時間：2016年5月31日 （周二），12:30-13:30

四、地點：主教樓913會議室

五、主持人：黃志剛，bevictor伟德官网副教授

摘要：The IPO literature suggests that top executives may intentionally underprice their firms’ IPOs to pursue private benefits. But little systematic evidence exists that executives receive private benefits personally. Using a unique dataset of the Chinese state-owned firms that went public during 1990-2006, we find evidence supporting that CEOs of state-owned firms attempt to get promotions by underpricing IPOs and allocating IPO shares to parties important to their careers. Specifically, we find that i) executives’ chance of promotion is positively correlated with the level of IPO underpricing, and ii) those executives who can benefit more from underpricing, such as younger executives, actually underprice more. We do not find similar effects in private firms. We also document a significant cost, in the form of punishments, associated with this agency behavior.