一、主題：Who Hate and Who Love the Leveling of the Playing Field?

二、主講人：王盈，新加坡南洋理工大學金融學博士，2013年在歐洲工商管理學院(INSEAD)從事博士後研究，現任bevictor伟德官网講師。她的主要研究方向包括：資産定價，公司金融，公司治理，機構投資者，并購與重組，企業社會責任等。論文曾參加2012 25th Australasian Finance and Banking Conference (Both PhD Forum and main conference), 2012 National Taiwan University International Conference on Finance, 2013年中國金融國際年會。

三、時間：2015年12月21日（周一），13:00-14:00

四、地點：學術會堂702會議室

五、主持人： 董兵兵，bevictor伟德官网講師

論文摘要：

We find that institutional trading in aggregate cannot positively predict stock returns after 2000, suggesting that institutional investors as a group no longer have an information advantage after the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD). Furthermore, we show that both the short-term and local institutional investors, who are documented to have an information advantage over their counterparts, lose their advantage in post-Reg FD period. By contrast, institutional investors who have skills in generating precise private information from public sources demonstrate a persistent and even greater information advantage. Last, we find that skilled institutional investors change their appetite for the information advantage to large and value stocks in post-Reg FD period. These findings imply that institutional investors rely heavily on selective disclosure to possess private information while Reg FD effectively levels the playing field and blocks their backdoors. Only the information advantage created from open sources is sustainable on the leveled playing field. Consequently, skilled institutional investors love the leveling of playing field but non-skilled institutional investors hate that.