一、主講人：葉冬豔，清華大學經濟管理學院博士、碩士和學士。2007-2008年在麻省理工學院斯隆管理學院訪問交流，2009年後在長江商學院做研究學者，2012-2013年美國哥倫比亞大學訪問交流，2013-2014年在加州大學聖地亞哥分校訪問交流。主要研究領域為資産定價和市場微觀結構。

二、主題：Disclosure, Learning, and Coordination

We analyze how informed investors can learn from each other through disclosed trades. We show that disclosure always increases market efficiency but its effect on informed investors' profits is ambiguous. When informed investors have highly complementary signals, disclosure makes them coordinate their trades, so their expected profits are higher. Moreover, an informed investor with very imprecise information would prefer competition in the presence of disclosure as he learns more from the other informed investor than the market maker and makes more profits than he would obtain if he is the only informed investor in the market. As a result, when information acquisition is costly and endogenous, there could exist herding in information acquisition.

三、時間：2015年1月21日，星期三上午，10:00-11:00

四、地點：bevictor伟德官网學院南路校區主教學樓913會議室