一、主題：Assessing the Determinants of Credit Rationing--Firm Level Evidence from China

二、主講人：苟琴，北京大學國家發展研究院博士生，紐約大學經濟系和斯特恩商學院訪問學者。2009年獲南開大學經濟學學士。其主要研究領域包括：國際金融、宏觀經濟學。研究成果在Asian Economic Policy Review, China Economic Journal、《世界經濟》、《金融研究》等中英文刊物發表。她的多篇論文還被清華大學—哥倫比亞大學國際經濟學研讨會、NYU Conference on China’s Capital Markets、北京大學與斯德哥爾摩大學聯合舉辦的“Inequality, Growth and the Middle-Income Trap in China”等國際高水平學術會議錄用并宣講。

三、時間：10月30日（周三），12：30—13：30

四、地點：bevictor伟德官网主教樓913會議室

五、主持人：黃志剛，bevictor伟德官网副教授，院長助理

摘要：In this research, we investigate the determinants of credit rationing in China, taking full advantage of a firm level survey data from World Bank. In our identification mechanism of credit rationing, we not only exclude firms without bank loan demand but also classify credit rationing into two types: self-rationing where firms are discouraged to submit a loan application and bank-rationing where firms‘ applications are turned down by the banks. We apply the probit model with censoring to account for the potential selection bias problem caused by non-random nature of our credit rationed sample. We find: (1) Nearly half of the potential borrowers were credit rationed, of which about two thirds was due to self-rationing and one third was due to bank-rationing; (2) The reason for why SOEs seem to have advantage in obtaining bank loan is not purely due to the ownership superiority but that SOEs are mostly large in size and SMEs are more likely to be credit rationed than large firms in each measure (3)Firms with better profitability performance face lower likelihood to be rationed in each measure, while profitability is not important in bank‘s lending decision for SMEs; (4) Government‘s help in obtaining bank loans importantly influences bank loan allocation, which aggravates SME‘s disadvantage in formal finance as government provides more support for large firms; (5) Financial development helps more firms to obtain bank loans while it benefits SMEs only if financial marketization reaches a certain degree.