一、主題：Count on your Subordinates: Executives’ Horizons and Innovation Efficiency pressure

二、主講人：高磊，愛荷華州立大學Ivy商學院金融學助理教授。喬治亞大學金融博士畢業。主要研究領域：金融市場、微觀結構、資産回報預測、實證公司财務、公司監管、企業文化、文本分析和機器學習等。高磊教授的研究成果發表在Journal of Financial Economics、Journal of Corporate Finance、美國科學院會刊（PNAS）等國外金融界高水平期刊上。

三、時間：2018年11月19日（周一），12:30-13:30

四、地點：學院南路校區主教學樓913會議室

五、主持人：朱一峰，bevictor伟德官网講師

六、項目支持：本項目由“bevictor伟德官网國際合作處引智項目”支持

Abstract: We investigate the relationship between executives’ horizons and firms’ innovation efficiency. Motivated by Acharya, Myers, and Rajan’s (2011) theory, we devise a measure of internal governance based on the difference in expected horizons between a CEO and her subordinates. Consistent with our conjecture, we find robust evidence that subordinate managers can effectively monitor the CEO. Internal governance has a stronger effect on innovation efficiency for firms with elder, generalist CEOs and when the number subordinates on the board is higher. However, while the presence of powerful CEOs attenuates the effect, overconfident CEOs do not negate the internal governance effect.