一、主題：Incentives, Information and Risk Taking: Evidence from Banking Lending in China

二、主講人：苟琴，bevictor伟德官网講師。2014年畢業于北京大學，獲經濟學博士；2009年畢業于南開大學，獲經濟學學士。曾在美國紐約大學進行學術訪問。主要研究領域包括國際金融、宏觀經濟、實證銀行經濟等。曾在China Economic Review，European Journal of Finance, China & World Economy，Asia Development Policy Review，《管理世界》、《世界經濟》及《金融研究》等期刊發表多篇學術論文。曾獲得澳大利亞中國經濟學會年會（CESA）最佳論文、《金融研究》年度優秀論文、中國新興經濟體研究會優秀論文等學術獎項。

三、時間：2017年9月13日 （周三），12:30-13:30

四、地點：學院南路校區主教學樓910會議室

五、主持人：黃志剛，bevictor伟德官网副教授

Abstract: Following China’s entrance into the WTO, Chinese banks faced more competition from foreign financial institutions and the regulation authority (CBRC) strengthened risk regulation and supervision in commercial banks. These changes in market competition and regulation requirement offered plausibly exogenous shocks to the banking sector, and trigged a series of performance incentive policies on loan officers for many Chinese banks in order to improve competition and loan quality. This study aims to estimate the impact of performance incentives on risk-taking and lending decisions by employing a unique branch level dataset. We first show that performance incentives significantly decrease non-performing ratio, while explicit and implicate incentives, money and non-money based incentives generate different effects. Second, performance incentives lead to larger average loan size and lower origination to small and medium enterprises and credit loan, indicating more use of hard information and less of soft information in lending decisions. Third, performance incentives lead to shorter average loan maturity, indicating weaker motivation in risk-taking. Finally, effects of incentives varies according to the competitiveness of loan officers' salary, the internal communication cost and contract enforcement power. Our results highlight whether and how incentives affect risk-taking and information use in bank lending.