Pacific-Basin Finance Journal Volume 40, Part B, December 2016, Pages 349–366

那些交易股票的CEO會采取更激進的公司投資策略嗎？

作者: Reza Bradrania (University of South Australia), P. Joakim Westerholm (The University of Sydney Business School), James Yeoh (The University of Sydney Business School)

摘要：這篇文章研究了交易股票比較活躍的CEO是否會導緻更高水平的公司投資。相比投資于固定收益資産，将全部财富中更高比例分配給股票資産的個人被定義為低風險厭惡。我們發現這種行為特征無論對個人還是對公司都是一緻的。在公司層面，有交易者CEO的公司會有更高的資本性支出和更多的并購，在個人層面，那些擁有較高投資額度的CEO會偏向更具冒險性的公司投資策略。這個發現也揭示了股票持有者是如何能夠更好地将自己的策略和CEO的偏向性結合起來的。即便考慮到潛在的内生性，例如在選擇特定公司的CEO和樣本選擇偏差等方面，這些結論也都是穩定的。

Do CEOs who trade shares adopt more aggressive corporate investment strategies?

Reza Bradrania (University of South Australia), P. Joakim Westerholm (The University of Sydney Business School), James Yeoh (The University of Sydney Business School)

ABSTRACT

This paper investigates whether CEOs who have active share trading accounts engage in higher levels of corporate investment. Individuals who allocate a higher proportion of their wealth to equities, as opposed to fixed income assets, are by definition less risk averse. We find that this behavioral attribute is consistent in both the personal and corporate domain. Corporations with trader CEOs have higher capital expenditures and make significantly more acquisitions, and CEOs with higher portfolio turnover engage in riskier forms of corporate investment. The findings shed light on how shareholders can better align CEO preferences with their own. These conclusions are robust to adjustments for potential endogeneity in the choice of CEO for a specific firm and sample selection bias.

原文鍊接：http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927538X16300117

翻譯：阙江靜