Journal of Financial Markets, Volume 31, November 2016, Pages 81–126

IPO相關的投資者訴訟的決定因素——CEO股權激勵和公司治理的影響

作者：Xingli Lia (Sunlife Everbright Insurance, China), Kuntara Pukthuanthongb (University of Missouri, USA), Marcus Glenn Walkerc (Fin-Consult, Germany), Thomas John Walkerd (Concordia University, Canada)

摘要：我們考察首次公開募股公司的激勵與治理機制，探究其如何影響證券欺詐及相關的投資者訴訟的發生。以前的研究主要關注增發股份的公司，而我們研究CEO激勵與IPO過程中的公司治理對IPO相關的投資者訴訟發生率的影響。結果顯示證券欺詐訴訟發生的概率會随着IPO前CEO的股權激勵而增加，表明管理層股權激勵存在“暗箱”。對于董事會被内部人員控制，CEO年齡更大、任期更短，或者CEO創立的公司，被起訴的風險更高。

關鍵詞：首次公開募股；CEO股權激勵；公司治理

The determinants of IPO-related shareholder litigation: The role of CEO equity incentives and corporate governance

Xingli Lia (Sunlife Everbright Insurance, China), Kuntara Pukthuanthongb (University of Missouri, USA), Marcus Glenn Walkerc (Fin-Consult, Germany), Thomas John Walkerd (Concordia University, Canada)

ABSTRACT

We examine how compensation and corporate governance mechanisms affect the occurrence of securities fraud and related shareholder litigation for initial public offering (IPO) firms. While prior research has focused on seasoned firms, we examine how CEO incentives and corporate governance in IPOs affect the incidence of IPO-related shareholder litigation. We find that the likelihood of securities fraud allegations increases with pre-IPO CEO equity incentives, suggesting a “dark side” to executive equity incentives. The risk of being sued is higher for firms whose boards are dominated by insiders, whose CEOs are older, have shorter tenure, or who founded the firm.

Keywords：Initial public offerings; CEO equity incentives; Corporate governance

原文鍊接：http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1386418116302178

翻譯：黃怡文