REVIEW OF FINANCE · VOL.20, ISSUE.5 · AUGUST 2016

讓股東決定高管薪酬！股東聲音及公司業績

作者：Vicente Cu?at (The London School of Economics), Mireia Giné (University of Pennsylvania and IESE Business School), Maria Guadalupe (INSEAD, CEPR and IZA)

摘要：這篇文章估計了由股東決定高管薪酬政策（SoP）的效果，它是一種由向股東定期對高管薪酬投票來增加股東“聲音”的政策。我們對股東發起SoP建議的投票采用斷點回歸設計。采用SoP可以帶來市場價值的大幅增長（5％）和長期盈利能力的改善。相反，它對薪酬水平和結構的影響有限。總而言之，我們的研究結果表明，SoP可以看作是一種重複定期對CEO信心的投票，也是一種懲戒方式。

Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance

Vicente Cu?at (The London School of Economics), Mireia Giné (University of Pennsylvania and IESE Business School), Maria Guadalupe (INSEAD, CEPR and IZA)

ABSTRACT

This article estimates the effects of Say-on-Pay (SoP), a policy that increases shareholder “voice” by providing shareholders with a regular vote on executive pay. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the votes on shareholder-sponsored SoP proposals. Adopting SoP leads to large increases in market value (5%) and to improvements in long-term profitability. In contrast, it has limited effects on pay levels and structure. Taken together our results suggest that SoP can be seen as a repeated regular vote of confidence on the CEO and that it serves as a disciplining device.

原文鍊接：http://rof.oxfordjournals.org/content/20/5/1799.abstract

翻譯：陳然