The Journal of Finance Volume 71, Issue5, October 2016, Pages 2239-3386

解雇成本和資本結構決策

作者：Matthew Serfling (Department of Finance-University of Tennessee)

摘要：本文利用國家層面的勞動保護法的頒發作為一個增加解雇成本的外生事件，用來檢驗解雇成本是如何影響資本結構決策的。本文發現在頒布了這些法律之後公司降低了債務比率，而且對于那些解雇成本較高的公司這個結果更加明顯。除此之外，本文還發現頒布這些法律之後，一個公司的營業杠杆系數增加了，收益變動率也增加了，并且雇傭變得更加嚴格。總之，這個結果和較高的解雇成本通過增加的财務困境成本來擠出财務杠杆的結論是一緻的。

Firing Costs and Capital Structure Decisions

Matthew Serfling (Department of Finance-University of Tennessee)

ABSTRACT

I exploit the adoption of state-level labor protection laws as an exogenous increase in employee firing costs to examine how the costs associated with discharging workers affect capital structure decisions. I find that firms reduce debt ratios following the adoption of these laws, with this result stronger for firms that experience larger increases in firing costs. I also document that, following the adoption of these laws, a firm's degree of operating leverage rises, earnings variability increases, and employment becomes more rigid. Overall, these results are consistent with higher firing costs crowding out financial leverage via increasing financial distress costs

原文鍊接： http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jofi.12403/full

翻譯：阙江靜