THE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE ·Volume 40, Oct 2016, Pages 1-23

高管任期、内部治理和股票市場流動性

作者：Pawan Jain (College of Business, University of Wyoming, Laramie), Christine Jiang (Fogelman College of Business and Economics, The University of Memphis), Mohamed Mekhaimer (School of Business, Clarkson University)

摘要：本文中，我們研究了内部治理（下屬經理可以通過它來有效地監督首席執行官）是否可以提升一個公司的流動性。通過使用首席執行官和他直屬下屬經理的任期之差來衡量内部治理，我們發現有着更好内部治理的公司會有較低的信息不對稱性和更高的流動性。進一步，我們發現内部治理在臨近首席執行官退休的公司、要求更高專業技能的公司和有着經驗豐富下屬經理的公司可以更加有效地增加公司流動性。我們得到的結論對于通用的公司治理的衡量方式、其他模型的設定方式以及其他衡量内部治理與流動性的方式都是穩健的。

Executives' horizon, internal governance and stock market liquidity

Pawan Jain (College of Business, University of Wyoming, Laramie), Christine Jiang (Fogelman College of Business and Economics, The University of Memphis), Mohamed Mekhaimer (School of Business, Clarkson University)

ABSTRACT

In this article, we examine whether internal governance, the process through which subordinate managers effectively monitor the chief executive officer (CEO), can improve a firm's liquidity. Using the difference in horizons between a CEO and his immediate subordinates to measure internal governance, we show that firms with better internal governance have lower information asymmetry and higher liquidity. Further, we show that internal governance is effective in enhancing liquidity for firms with CEOs close to retirement, firms that require higher firmspecific skills, and firms with experienced subordinate managers. Our results are robust to inclusion of conventional governance measures, alternative model specifications, and different measures of internal governance and liquidity

Keywords: Executives' horizon、Internal governance、Corporate governance、Subordinate managers、Liquidity

原文鍊接：http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0929119916300712/1-s2.0-S0929119916300712-main.pdf?_tid=44ad600c-780f-11e6-806d-00000aab0f02&acdnat=1473591945_dbeb3f48b8be7c7194272c81f7abfa5e

翻譯：田佳琪