Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis / Volume 51 / Issue 02 / April 2016

分析師跟蹤和真實盈餘管理：準實驗證據

作者：Rustom M. Irani, David Oesch

摘要：我們研究了證券分析師如何影響管理者對不同類型盈餘管理的使用。為了得到可靠的因果關系，我們采用了準實驗方法---利用因為券商合并而造成的分析師外生性減少。我們發現管理者通過減少真實盈餘管理，同時增加權責發生制操作來應對損失。這些效應對具有更少收益覆蓋和近乎零收入的公司更加顯著。我們的因果關系證據顯示，作為對分析師壓力的回應，管理者使用真實盈餘管理來提高公司短期表現。如果僅基于權責發生制進行研究，這種效應并不明顯。

Analyst Coverage and Real Earnings Management: Quasi-Experimental Evidence

Rustom M. Irani, David Oesch

ABSTRACT

We study how securities analysts influence managers’ use of different types of earnings management. To isolate causality, we employ a quasi-experiment that exploits exogenous reductions in analyst following resulting from brokerage house mergers. We find that managers respond to the coverage loss by decreasing real earnings management while increasing accrual manipulation. These effects are significantly stronger among firms with less coverage and for firms close to the zero-earnings threshold. Our causal evidence suggests that managers use real earnings management to enhance short-term performance in response to analyst pressure, effects that are not uncovered when focusing solely on accrual-based methods.

原文鍊接：

http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=10362105&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022109016000156

翻譯：傅亞平