一、系列講座日程

第86期：
主講人：Yiming Qian
題  目：Can firms run away from climate-change risk? Evidence from the pricing of bank loans
時  間：2020年6月24日星期三，20:30-22:00（北京時間）
主持人：顧弦副教授  

第87期：
主講人：林則君（Tse-Chun Lin）
題  目：Firm Trustworthiness and Bank Loan Pricing
時  間：2020年7月1日星期三，上午10:00-11:30（北京時間）
主持人：黃瑜琴副教授，應用金融系主任

第88期：
主講人：Yiming Qian
題  目：Initial public offerings Chinese style
時  間：2020年7月8日星期三，20:30-22:00（北京時間）
主持人：顧弦副教授  

第89期：
主講人：林則君（Tse-Chun Lin）
題  目：Behavioral consistency in SEOs and M&As: Evidence from CEO anchoring heuristic
時  間：2020年7月15日星期三，上午10:00-11:30（北京時間）
主持人：黃瑜琴副教授，應用金融系主任
 

二、會議形式與地點

騰訊會議【具體房間臨時通知】

三、主講嘉賓簡介

Yiming Qian，美國康涅狄格大學 Toscano Family 金融學講席教授。她在紐約大學Stern商學院獲得金融學博士學位。主要研究領域為公司金融，包括IPO、并購與重組、行為金融和新興市場等方向。其學術論文曾發表于許多國際頂尖學術期刊，包括Journal of Financial Economics，the Review of Financial Studies，Management Science，Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis，Review of Finance等。
林則君（Tse-Chun Lin），香港大學經濟及工商管理學院金融學教授。本科畢業于台灣大學，丁伯根經濟研究所（Tinbergen Institute）碩士，荷蘭阿姆斯特丹大學博士。他的研究領域為行為金融學，曾在American Economic Review, Journal of Financial Economics, Review of Financial Studies, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Management Science, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Review of Finance等雜志發表高水平論文十多篇，《經濟學人》、《華爾街日報》、《彭博》、《投資》等雜志也對他的研究進行了專題報道，是該領域非常有影響的經濟學家。他擔任了Financial Mangement 的Associate Editor, 以及Review of Financial Studies、Management Science、Review of Finance、Financial Management、Journal of Banking and Finance、Journal of Empirical Finance等多個雜志的評審人。  

四、講座論文摘要  

Can firms run away from climate-change risk? Evidence from the pricing of bank loans

We examine whether climate-change risk affects firms’ cost of capital when firms can adapt to the risk. We find firms’ cost of long-term loans increases with sea level rise (SLR) risk, but this effect mainly holds among firms with high adjustment costs to the risk, i.e., firms for whom it is hard to relocate or otherwise diversify SLR risk. Moreover, the spread-risk sensitivity is higher if the bank has more experience with the risk and in times of heightened media attention. This suggests banks have limited attention to this unconventional risk. Finally, affected firms respond by using less long-term debt.

Initial public offerings Chinese style

We examine various aspects of the IPO market in China—the policy history, IPO pricing, bid and allocation, and post-market trading. We examine these issues under two lenses: IPO theories and the unique regulatory environment in China. We show that heavy-handed regulations cause inefficient IPO offer prices and excessive initial returns.  Investors treat IPOs as lotteries with extreme short-term returns, with little incentives for long-term investment. The auction selling method, however, works as it should be. Mutual funds bid more smartly than other investors, and their advantages are unlikely due to underwriters’ preferential treatments. Finally, we also discuss the direction of future regulation reforms (including the latest science and technology board, or STAR market).

Firm Trustworthiness and Bank Loan Pricing

Using a novel dataset of firm-level perceived trustworthiness from the news media and social media, we find that lending banks charge significantly higher loan spread on firms with lower trustworthiness. Loans to these firms also tend to have shorter loan maturities, more financial covenants, and higher likelihoods of requiring collateral. We further use the Regulation SHO Pilot program as an exogenous variation and find that the effects of trustworthiness are reduced when pilot firms are better disciplined by short sellers. That is, banks rely less on soft information like trustworthiness when the overall information and governance environments regarding the borrowing firms are improved. Last, firm trustworthiness effects are stronger for firms with high corruption culture, weak corporate governance, and higher information asymmetry. Collectively, our results suggest that perceived firm trustworthiness from the stakeholders conveys valuable credit quality information to bank loan lenders.  

Behavioral consistency in SEOs and M&As: Evidence from CEO anchoring heuristic

We examine whether CEOs carry anchoring heuristic in personal decision-making over to corporate decisions. We first show that CEOs tend to anchor on the 52-week high stock price for insider selling and then identify the “anchoring CEOs.” Firms with anchoring CEOs are more likely to issue seasoned equity offerings when stock prices approach the 52-week high. Moreover, for mergers and acquisitions deals by anchoring bidder CEOs, offer premium increases more with the target’s 52-week high stock price. The results are more pronounced for situations with higher valuation uncertainty. Overall, anchoring CEOs behave consistently across personal and professional situations.

五、支持機構與項目
bevictor伟德官网引智項目
bevictor伟德官网學術交流部
bevictor伟德官网應用金融系
bevictor伟德官网金融科技系