THE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE ·Volume 40, Oct 2016, Pages 24–46

國際機構投資者監督效率背後的驅動力量：來自盈餘管理的證據

作者：Incheol Kim (College of Business & Entrepreneurship-The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley), Steve Miller (Haub School of Business-Saint Joseph's University), Hong Wan (School of Business-State University of New York at Oswego), Bin Wang (Craig School of Business-Missouri Western State University)

摘要：本文在一個國際的視野中研究了國際機構投資者監督公司盈餘管理效率背後的驅動力量。我們提出了3種不同的驅動力量和2個競争性的假設：“家鄉優勢假說”認為，由于和被監控的信息較為臨近，當地的機構在識别盈餘管理方面，相對于國外的機構具有比較優勢；與之相對，“國際投資者假說”認為，國際投資者具有比較優勢因為它們有更強烈的行動主義傾向和采用更高級監控技術的能力。與“家鄉優勢假說”的觀點相一緻，總體來講，由當地機構而非外國機構投資者持股，盈餘管理相對較少；當距離被監控信息更近時，國外機構投資者的監管效率會提升。與“國際投資者假說”的觀點相一緻，當有着更大的代理沖突或

者更弱的管理控制或者國内外機構的監控技術差距變大時，國外機構的監督效率會提升。

關鍵詞：機構投資者，盈餘管理，公司治理，地理距離

Drivers behind the monitoring effectiveness of global institutional investors: Evidence from earnings management

Incheol Kim (College of Business & Entrepreneurship-The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley), Steve Miller (Haub School of Business-Saint Joseph's University), Hong Wan (School of Business-State University of New York at Oswego), Bin Wang (Craig School of Business-Missouri Western State University)

ABSTRACT

This paper studies the drivers behind the monitoring effectiveness of institutional investors in curbing earnings management in an international setting. We identify three distinct drivers and propose two competing hypotheses: the hometown advantage hypothesis predicts that because of proximity to monitoring information, domestic institutions have a comparative advantage over foreign institutions in deterring earnings management, whereas the global investor hypothesis predicts that foreign institutions have a comparative advantage because of their proclivity toward activism and ability to deploy superior monitoring technologies. Consistent with the hometown advantage hypothesis, in aggregate, domestic, but not foreign, institutional ownership is associated with less earnings management; the monitoring effectiveness of foreign institutions improves as they gain proximity to monitoring information. Consistent with the global investor hypothesis, the monitoring effectiveness of foreign institutions improves in environments of greater agency conflicts or weaker governance controls or when the gap in monitoring technology between foreign and domestic institutions widens.

Keywords: Institutional investors, Earnings management, Corporate governance, Geographic distance

原文鍊接：http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0929119916300724/1-s2.0-S0929119916300724-main.pdf?_tid=698ffe6a-7c75-11e6-95ef-00000aab0f27&acdnat=1474075620_21a54525f72edab1657bb37a321fc597

翻譯：田佳琪