Review of Financial Studies, June 2015, v. 28, iss. 6, pp. 1701-36.

賣空行為的無形之手：賣空會約束盈餘管理嗎？

作者：Massimo Massa (INSEAD), Bohui Zhang (School of Banking and Finance, UNSW Business School), Hong Zhang (PBC School of Finance, Tsinghua University and INSEAD)

摘要：本文假設賣空對經理人的約束作用會使他們減少盈餘管理。通過使用2002至2009年間33個國家公司層面的賣空數據，我們發現賣空威脅與盈餘管理間顯著的負相關性。基于工具變量和外生監管實驗的測試提供了賣空行為和盈餘管理間存在因果關系的證據。本文的結論說明賣空可以作為一種外部治理機制對經理人産生約束作用。

The Invisible Hand of Short Selling: Does Short Selling Discipline Earnings Management?

Massimo Massa (INSEAD), Bohui Zhang (School of Banking and Finance, UNSW Business School), Hong Zhang (PBC School of Finance, Tsinghua University and INSEAD)

ABSTRACT

We hypothesize that short selling has a disciplining role vis-à-vis firm managers that forces them to reduce earnings management. Using firm-level short-selling data for thirty-three countries collected over a sample period from 2002 to 2009, we document a significantly negative relationship between the threat of short selling and earnings management. Tests based on instrumental variable and exogenous regulatory experiments offer evidence of a causal link between short selling and earnings management. Our findings suggest that short selling functions as an external governance mechanism to discipline managers.

原文鍊接：

http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/content/28/6/1701.abstract

翻譯：黃怡文