一、主題：Does options trading affect managerial incentives in corporate social responsibility strategies?

二、主講人：
林則君（Tse-Chun Lin），香港大學經濟及工商管理學院金融學教授。本科畢業于台灣大學，丁伯根經濟研究所（Tinbergen Institute）碩士，荷蘭阿姆斯特丹大學博士。他的研究領域為行為金融學，曾在American Economic Review, Journal of Financial Economics, Review of Financial Studies, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Management Science, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Review of Finance等雜志發表高水平論文十多篇，《經濟學人》、《華爾街日報》、《彭博》、《投資》等雜志也對他的研究進行了專題報道，是該領域非常有影響的經濟學家。他擔任了Financial Management 的Associate Editor, 以及Review of Financial Studies、Management Science、Review of Finance、Financial Management、Journal of Banking and Finance、Journal of Empirical Finance等多個雜志的評審人。  

三、時間：2020年11月12日星期四，上午10:00-11:30

四、地點： 騰訊會議，ID：523 788 591

五、主持人：黃瑜琴副教授，bevictor伟德官网應用金融系主任

摘要：We posit that more managerial hedging opportunities and lower career concerns induced by active options trading provide stronger managerial incentives to implement corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies. We find that firms with more options trading tend to have better CSR performance. This effect can be attributed to several channels, including product market competition, takeover exposure, reputation and goodwill, CEO career horizon, and pay-risk sensitivity. We find consistent results using a quasi-natural experiment that reduces options trading costs of treated firms. Insider hedging transactions also corroborate our findings. Overall, active derivative markets have real effects on shaping firms’ CSR strategies.